Sunday, July 09, 2006
Gene M. Bridges Too Fails to Differentiate Between Pre-Sin Adam and Men
It seems that Mr. Bridges has added to Alan's failure to differentiate between a pre-sin Adam and men. It is this failure that placed Alan Kurschner into the realm of being a hyper-Calvinist. Gene writes:
"God’s decree includes ends and means. The means by which evil is “caused” is His permission, which is just as effacious as His activity, but the means is passive. That is, God’s decree renders an event certain, but He sometimes, through inaction permits something to occur. God’s decree is the necessary condition, His decreed means (His permission) is the sufficient condition. In permission, men are left, for all intents and purposes on their own. I find it highly ironic, and downright irrational, that Mr. Mart would then render this objection, since men are given the permission by God to do as they want to do in this scheme. Isn’t the “volitional theology” goal for men to be allowed to do what they want and for God to honor their free will decision."
Notice here the absense of dealing with a pre-sin Adam. Gene only refers to sinful men born after Adam's fall. The question that Ala has had trouble dealing with is where did pre-sin Adam get his desire to sin. Alan states that God decreed it and caused it to happen by removing His hand of grace from Adam. This removal of grace on Adam goes beyond what traditional Calvinism teaches. As stated in earlier posts, most Calvinists will either proclaim mystery or free choice because to go beyond this libels God. This is where Alan has parted company with his Calvinistic brethren.
Again Gene writes:
"I’d add that libertarian action theory (Arminianism) doesn’t get Mr. Mart off the hook. Arminians have God decreeing the fall as well. Here is the infralapsarian order of decrees in Calvinism: Creation, Fall, Election/Reprobation, Atonement, Application of Atonement; Notice the fall is decreed. Here is the Arminian order (which every Arminian should be reminded of from time to time): Creation, Fall, Atonement, General Call, Election of all who believe. Notice that Arminianism has God decreeing the Fall as well. Only the Open Theist is in a position to deny this."
But what Gene fails to understand is that God elects and decrees in accord with His foreknowledge. God does not choose apart from His foreknowledge. Again, according Edwards' view of the will, men must act according to their strongest desire based on the condition of their wills. In this view, the unregenerate man cannot do what is pleasing to God. He can only sin based on his will. But Adam was declared a good creature by God and his nature was without sin. The desire of sinning against God would have been impossible according to this view of the will. Where did Adam get his desire to sin? From God? No! Does Gene believe God gave Adam the desire to sin too?
It seems that Mr. Bridges has added to Alan's failure to differentiate between a pre-sin Adam and men. It is this failure that placed Alan Kurschner into the realm of being a hyper-Calvinist. Gene writes:
"God’s decree includes ends and means. The means by which evil is “caused” is His permission, which is just as effacious as His activity, but the means is passive. That is, God’s decree renders an event certain, but He sometimes, through inaction permits something to occur. God’s decree is the necessary condition, His decreed means (His permission) is the sufficient condition. In permission, men are left, for all intents and purposes on their own. I find it highly ironic, and downright irrational, that Mr. Mart would then render this objection, since men are given the permission by God to do as they want to do in this scheme. Isn’t the “volitional theology” goal for men to be allowed to do what they want and for God to honor their free will decision."
Notice here the absense of dealing with a pre-sin Adam. Gene only refers to sinful men born after Adam's fall. The question that Ala has had trouble dealing with is where did pre-sin Adam get his desire to sin. Alan states that God decreed it and caused it to happen by removing His hand of grace from Adam. This removal of grace on Adam goes beyond what traditional Calvinism teaches. As stated in earlier posts, most Calvinists will either proclaim mystery or free choice because to go beyond this libels God. This is where Alan has parted company with his Calvinistic brethren.
Again Gene writes:
"I’d add that libertarian action theory (Arminianism) doesn’t get Mr. Mart off the hook. Arminians have God decreeing the fall as well. Here is the infralapsarian order of decrees in Calvinism: Creation, Fall, Election/Reprobation, Atonement, Application of Atonement; Notice the fall is decreed. Here is the Arminian order (which every Arminian should be reminded of from time to time): Creation, Fall, Atonement, General Call, Election of all who believe. Notice that Arminianism has God decreeing the Fall as well. Only the Open Theist is in a position to deny this."
But what Gene fails to understand is that God elects and decrees in accord with His foreknowledge. God does not choose apart from His foreknowledge. Again, according Edwards' view of the will, men must act according to their strongest desire based on the condition of their wills. In this view, the unregenerate man cannot do what is pleasing to God. He can only sin based on his will. But Adam was declared a good creature by God and his nature was without sin. The desire of sinning against God would have been impossible according to this view of the will. Where did Adam get his desire to sin? From God? No! Does Gene believe God gave Adam the desire to sin too?
# posted by Rob Mart @ 11:25 PM 
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a. If you name a motive behind his action, then you abandon libertarian freedom for determinism.
b. God can "give desires" by placing us in the right place, at the right time, and in the right circumstances.
c. The "standard Reformed view of the will," post-fall is that man follows his strongest desire and his nature and is inclined to evil. He cannot do any spirtual good to accompany his salvation and any acts of civil virtue he does are tainted by sin. He cannot, of his own volition, turn to Christ apart from effacious grace.
d. The "standard Reformed view of the will," pre-fall is that man was created "good" but in a mutable state. He was not created without the capacity to sin if he had a reason sufficient to himself to do so. Rather, he was created "not knowing good or evil" by experience and thus able to do both. In other words, he was able to do good or evil and inclined to neither good nor evil. This state is a unique state and non-repeatable. At most, some state that Adam was created with the inclination for good but he was not sealed in righteouness. Adam had to do something more (obey the covenant/eat from the tree of life) in order for that to enter eternal blessedness and be sealed. Any failure to do that would lead to a fall and bondage to sin.
These are elementary distinctions that you simply overlook.
As a matter of fact, the text does depict God as withholding contraining grace. He gave them a task to perform and a covenant to keep. The Garden foreshadows the Tabernacle, and we have a cretion mandate and a basic law given, all of which obtain to a covenant motif. They fall, in terms of the narrative, on the Sabbath, while God is resting, since the 7th day, unlike all the others has no morning and evening. In terms of the narrative, therefore, what happens is during a Sabbath. What's more, it is the only Sabbath in which God is said to be "resting," implying that He is not active this day. He blesses the creation and sits back from tending it. He is not depicted as an active participant after their creation in the narrative until after they sin, at which time He comes and delivers a lawsuit to the two Sabbath-breakers, who, by violating the Sabbath by taking the fruit they were commanded not to eat, in turn violated the entire Decalogue.
This removal of grace on Adam goes beyond what traditional Calvinism teaches. As stated in earlier posts, most Calvinists will either proclaim mystery or free choice because to go beyond this libels God. This is where Alan has parted company with his Calvinistic brethren.
Au Contrare:
Boettner writes, "He (God)simply withheld that undeserved constraining grace with which Adam would infallibly not have fallen, which grace He was under no obligation to bestow." (Reformed Doctrine of Predestination, p. 235). So much for what you think our "Calvinistic brethren" have said about this topic.
R.L. Dabney made a similar observation in which he spoke of the extinguishability of a candle's flame if it is left alone and not tended.
"To make a candle burn, it must be lighted; to make it go out, it need only be let alone. The most probable account of the way sin entered a holy breast first, is this: An object was apprehended as in its mere nature desirable; not yet as unlawful. So far there is no sin. But as the soul, finite and fallible in its attention, permitted an overweening apprehension and desire of its natural adaptation to confer pleasure, to override the feeling of its unlawfulness, concupiscence was developed. And the element which first caused the mere innocent sense of the natural goodness of the object to pass into evil concupiscence, was privative, viz., the failure to consider and prefer God's will as the superior good to mere natural good. Thus natural desire passed into sinful selfishness, which is the root of all evil. So that we have only the privative element to account for. When we assert the certainty of ungodly choice in an evil will, we only assert that a state of volition whose moral quality is a defect, a negation, cannot become the cause of a positive righteousness. When we assert the mutability of a holy will in a finite creature, we only say that the positive element of righteousness of disposition may, in the shape of defect, admit the negative, not being infinite. So that the cases are not parallel: and the result, though mysterious, is not impossible. To make a candle positively give light, it must be lighted; to cause it to sink into darkness, it is only necessary to let it alone: its length being limited, it burns out." (Adam's Fall and Free Will).
But what Gene fails to understand is that God elects and decrees in accord with His foreknowledge. God does not choose apart from His foreknowledge.
This is a vicious circle for you. On what does God base His foreknowledge if libertarian action theory is true? These are definitionally causeless choices, and if you so much as appeal to any motive that lies behind Adam's sin or any other action of any man at any time, you depart from libertarian action theory.
Notice here the absense of dealing with a pre-sin Adam. Gene only refers to sinful men born after Adam's fall.
On the contrary, I'm including this as well. For, in all the Scholastic orders of decrees from Supralapsarian down to Arminian, you have God permitting the fall of man by an ends-means relational decree. The decreed means is the sufficient condition to obtain the end. The difference is that it is bare permission for the Arminian, not effacious permission for the Amyraldian, Infra, and Supra. We all affirm that God permitted the fall by decree. The point is this: you cannot level this criticism without acknowledging you must answer it too.
b. God can "give desires" by placing us in the right place, at the right time, and in the right circumstances.
c. The "standard Reformed view of the will," post-fall is that man follows his strongest desire and his nature and is inclined to evil. He cannot do any spirtual good to accompany his salvation and any acts of civil virtue he does are tainted by sin. He cannot, of his own volition, turn to Christ apart from effacious grace.
d. The "standard Reformed view of the will," pre-fall is that man was created "good" but in a mutable state. He was not created without the capacity to sin if he had a reason sufficient to himself to do so. Rather, he was created "not knowing good or evil" by experience and thus able to do both. In other words, he was able to do good or evil and inclined to neither good nor evil. This state is a unique state and non-repeatable. At most, some state that Adam was created with the inclination for good but he was not sealed in righteouness. Adam had to do something more (obey the covenant/eat from the tree of life) in order for that to enter eternal blessedness and be sealed. Any failure to do that would lead to a fall and bondage to sin.
These are elementary distinctions that you simply overlook.
As a matter of fact, the text does depict God as withholding contraining grace. He gave them a task to perform and a covenant to keep. The Garden foreshadows the Tabernacle, and we have a cretion mandate and a basic law given, all of which obtain to a covenant motif. They fall, in terms of the narrative, on the Sabbath, while God is resting, since the 7th day, unlike all the others has no morning and evening. In terms of the narrative, therefore, what happens is during a Sabbath. What's more, it is the only Sabbath in which God is said to be "resting," implying that He is not active this day. He blesses the creation and sits back from tending it. He is not depicted as an active participant after their creation in the narrative until after they sin, at which time He comes and delivers a lawsuit to the two Sabbath-breakers, who, by violating the Sabbath by taking the fruit they were commanded not to eat, in turn violated the entire Decalogue.
This removal of grace on Adam goes beyond what traditional Calvinism teaches. As stated in earlier posts, most Calvinists will either proclaim mystery or free choice because to go beyond this libels God. This is where Alan has parted company with his Calvinistic brethren.
Au Contrare:
Boettner writes, "He (God)simply withheld that undeserved constraining grace with which Adam would infallibly not have fallen, which grace He was under no obligation to bestow." (Reformed Doctrine of Predestination, p. 235). So much for what you think our "Calvinistic brethren" have said about this topic.
R.L. Dabney made a similar observation in which he spoke of the extinguishability of a candle's flame if it is left alone and not tended.
"To make a candle burn, it must be lighted; to make it go out, it need only be let alone. The most probable account of the way sin entered a holy breast first, is this: An object was apprehended as in its mere nature desirable; not yet as unlawful. So far there is no sin. But as the soul, finite and fallible in its attention, permitted an overweening apprehension and desire of its natural adaptation to confer pleasure, to override the feeling of its unlawfulness, concupiscence was developed. And the element which first caused the mere innocent sense of the natural goodness of the object to pass into evil concupiscence, was privative, viz., the failure to consider and prefer God's will as the superior good to mere natural good. Thus natural desire passed into sinful selfishness, which is the root of all evil. So that we have only the privative element to account for. When we assert the certainty of ungodly choice in an evil will, we only assert that a state of volition whose moral quality is a defect, a negation, cannot become the cause of a positive righteousness. When we assert the mutability of a holy will in a finite creature, we only say that the positive element of righteousness of disposition may, in the shape of defect, admit the negative, not being infinite. So that the cases are not parallel: and the result, though mysterious, is not impossible. To make a candle positively give light, it must be lighted; to cause it to sink into darkness, it is only necessary to let it alone: its length being limited, it burns out." (Adam's Fall and Free Will).
But what Gene fails to understand is that God elects and decrees in accord with His foreknowledge. God does not choose apart from His foreknowledge.
This is a vicious circle for you. On what does God base His foreknowledge if libertarian action theory is true? These are definitionally causeless choices, and if you so much as appeal to any motive that lies behind Adam's sin or any other action of any man at any time, you depart from libertarian action theory.
Notice here the absense of dealing with a pre-sin Adam. Gene only refers to sinful men born after Adam's fall.
On the contrary, I'm including this as well. For, in all the Scholastic orders of decrees from Supralapsarian down to Arminian, you have God permitting the fall of man by an ends-means relational decree. The decreed means is the sufficient condition to obtain the end. The difference is that it is bare permission for the Arminian, not effacious permission for the Amyraldian, Infra, and Supra. We all affirm that God permitted the fall by decree. The point is this: you cannot level this criticism without acknowledging you must answer it too.
Gene, nice to hear from you. First of all, God never gives men the desire to sin. God does not tempt men. Second, Boettner and Dabney's illustrations fail to answer the all important question of where Adam got his desire to sin. Withholding grace, while it may appear to solve this dilemna, fails to provide where Adam got this foreign idea to sin. It was foreign because God declared Adam good and his nature was without sin. This elementary distinction you have simply overlooked.
Your amusing insight into God resting from his tending with Adam is interesting but without biblical foundation. Just because God is silent during the time Adam committed sin does not necessarily mean God withdrew his grace from Adam at this moment. God is all knowing and his withdrawal of grace from Adam is a violation his His holy character. God is sovereign but He is also holy and the idea a withdrawal of grace from His good, sinless creature is what makes reformed theology repulsive. God loved Adam so much that He gave Adam Eve. There is no mention of God removing His grace from Adam. You and others have failed to provide any biblical support for this ridiculous notion. Nice try, Gene.
Your amusing insight into God resting from his tending with Adam is interesting but without biblical foundation. Just because God is silent during the time Adam committed sin does not necessarily mean God withdrew his grace from Adam at this moment. God is all knowing and his withdrawal of grace from Adam is a violation his His holy character. God is sovereign but He is also holy and the idea a withdrawal of grace from His good, sinless creature is what makes reformed theology repulsive. God loved Adam so much that He gave Adam Eve. There is no mention of God removing His grace from Adam. You and others have failed to provide any biblical support for this ridiculous notion. Nice try, Gene.
Gene, I wonder why Alan has removed the post concerning the cause of Adam's sin from his blog. Can you tell me?
First of all, God never gives men the desire to sin. God does not tempt men.
Really? According to Scripture the Holy Spirit led Jesus into the wilderness. There he was tempted by Satan. He sent Jesus into the right time and right place. According to the Bible God incited David to make a census, or was that Satan? Oh, that's right, God used Satan as his agent. This is called secondary causality.
Calvinists have doctrine of secondary causation, perhaps you should look into it.
Second, Boettner and Dabney's illustrations fail to answer the all important question of where Adam got his desire to sin. Withholding grace, while it may appear to solve this dilemna, fails to provide where Adam got this foreign idea to sin. It was foreign because God declared Adam good and his nature was without sin. This elementary distinction you have simply overlooked.
This is an assertion without a supporting argument on your part actually interacting with Dabney, but I'll let that pass for now.
I cited them, because you stated that two separate propositions.
First you stated:
This removal of grace on Adam goes beyond what traditional Calvinism teaches.
But "traditional Calvinism" does teach that very thing. So your original statement was flatly disproven.
Then you went on to assert elsewhere that it was our view that Adam was good by nature . You stated: It was foreign because God declared Adam good and his nature was without sin. This elementary distinction you have simply overlooked.
I assume you mean this ontologically good. I have overlooked nothing. Being without sin and in a state of positive moral goodness that is incapable of evil "by nature" are not convertible propositions. You're the one that has overlooked this.
Ontologically, Adam was "without sin" but in a state of innocence, not in a glorified state of positive moral goodness. Classical theologians call this the Libertas Adami.
Likewise, our view is that he was created in a state of innocence, not ontological goodness. He was able to sin and not to sin. He was not created in a state of goodness. He was created in a state of innocency, not knowing good and not knowing evil. In other words, in his created state man was able to good and evil, but by nature inclined to neither good nor evil. Your entire assumption that you have not proven is that Adam was by nature inclined to good. That would be so in the Redeemed state, where we can do good or evil but are inclined to do good or the glorified state, where we can do good but not evil and are inclined to good but not evil and are immutably locked into that state. That inclination simply does not always prevail in the Redeemed state, because we are still dealing with the principle of sin and are not constrained from sin by nature as we are in the glorified state.
I'm about to have major cancer surgery and do not know if you will even see this, but I will be unable to reply to you for many months, if at all. I suggest you purchase Thomas Boston's book, Human Nature in Its 4fold State.
You seem to be hung up on the meaning of "nature" in these discussions.
There are at least two uses of the term "nature" that need to be distinguished if one's exposition is to have any hope of avoiding the most absurd equivocations or incoherance.
The first is what we might call the *kind-property* view of natures. This account of natures answers the question: What *kind* of entity is the given individual? This account treats natures as *natural kind* properties, where properties are *abstract* objects of a certain sort. Among the important characteristics of such objects: (a) they have the property of possibly having instances, or possibly having individuals stand in the *exemplification relation* to them, and (b) the posited objects are causally inert. That is, the objects do not *cause* any object to be such-and-such, or thus-and-so.
The second is what could be called the "constituency" view of human natures, where human natures are (complex) dispositions (or in Evan's preferred terminology "predispositions"), inclinations, or similar entities; where each of these entities is a constituent, or a (mereological) *part* of some concrete individual, like a moral agent or a personal substance. This account of natures makes no attempt to tell us what *kind* of entity a given individual is, but rather, it attempts to tell us what constitutes a moral agent, and what relation his relevant constituent "parts" bear to his actions or behavior. The thing to note here is that the posited entities are *causal* entities of some sort (which alone should clue one in to the fact that this account of "nature" differs significantly from the kind-property view mentioned above).
Here are some important consequences to note about these two uses and their differences:
(1) when the kind-property account of natures is in view, it makes no *literal* sense to ask whether human nature or humanity *itself* is morally good or evil. Humanity and human nature are neither good nor evil. The reason why is obvious: only moral agents can be good or evil, and natural kind properties (or any properties at all for that matter) are not moral agents. They are causally inert, abstract objects. On this understanding of natures, it makes no more sense to say of humanity that it is morally good or evil than it makes sense to say of the number 8 that its morally good or evil.
(2) when the kind-property account of natures is in view, the claim that any morally significant action A performed by some individual was *determined* by the human nature of that individual is *false*, since no morally significant behavior or properties are *kind-essential* properties of humanity or human nature. At best, such moral qualities are *contingent* properties of humanity. This is evidenced by the moral goodness of prelapsarian humans like Adam and Eve (and Christ), as well as the postlapsarian sinfulness of humans like you and I.
So, in the fourfold state of human nature, we teach:
Created State: Telelogically/Morally Able to do : Good (yes) Evil (yes) - Ontologically (By nature inclined to) Good (no) Evil (no)
Following (for space) the same categorical pattern:
Fallen: Good (no) Evil (yes) - Good (no) Evil (yes)
Redeemed: Good (yes) Evil (yes) - Good (yes) Evil (no)
Glorified: Good (yes) Evil (no) - Good (yes) Evil (no)
God pronounces creation "good" at the end of Genesis 1. This is an example of the first defintion of "nature." But, there is also no pronouncement that Adam is morally perfect or incapable of doing evil. Rather, he knows God's commands, and is created innocent and does not know evil. Adam and Eve had the moral power to obey all these expectations of their Sovereign Master, and did not have a fallen mind that would obscure what was right and true. However, they were not glorified humans in an ontologically immutable, holy state. Rather, they were "holy" because that's all they knew. They were "happy," because that's all they knew.
They were also created with a mind and the power to reason, and it is here that Satan tempts them. They formed a new set of values, and it is from here that their motive to sin sprung.
"Determinism" with relation to will refers not only to the internal desires but the external as well. The question of "why did Adam and Eve sin" does not arise from questions about their internal moral state in Reformed Theology (as you seem to think) but of the determination of their outward conditions, for these, in turn, can *also* determine our behavior. The question arises as to how the two good result in the fall, if the creation is kind-property good and man is "holy, just, and good" but yet mutable.
Sin is itself framed here through temptation, but temptation to what? To be like God and to eat, neither of which are, in themselves, sinful desires. The desire to "be like God" is not a sinful desire in itself. It is natural for man to do that. That is precisely what sanctification in the life of the believer is. It is "being like God" on God's terms. So, what we have here is Adam acting with "good intentions" and yet deceived but, in so doing, violating God's law because, for a motive sufficient for action, he has formed a new value system. That is frequently the way temptation is framed in Scripture. The desire to do x is not, in itself, ontologically "evil," but teleologically it is, because it moves you to violate a command of God in order to satisfy that desire. So, even if Adam can be said to be ontologically "good" we have him acting on a "good" desire by "evil" methods. So, even on your own view, there is no conflict here. The point here is this: all we need to prove is that there was a motive. Why? Because libertarian action theory denies that motives are causes of moral action.
This is, in point of fact, the way the temptation of Jesus is framed. Jesus was worthy of worship; all the kingdoms of the world belong to him already; hunger is not in itself a sinful desire; rather the temptation for him is to set aside His mission. Some have further argued, in my opinion not very persuasively, that if Jesus had chosen not to enact His mission, He would not have sinned, because He did not have to enact His mission at all anyway; it was His to enact as an act of grace and mercy. For Adam, this was not the case, because he was certainly under a divine command to act as a priest in the proto-templar Garden. The real test was for him to cast out the serpent. He ate the fruit, where he should have cast out the serpent.
Just because God is silent during the time Adam committed sin does not necessarily mean God withdrew his grace from Adam at this moment.
You seem to think grace is always unmerited favor. There is another definition, "empowerment to act" and still another "common grace." Likewise, we distinguish between special grace (like inspiration of Scripture) and common grace too. According to both the Calvinist order of decrees and the Arminian, "permission" is the withdrawal of the empowerment not unmerited favor and of special grace, but not common grace. In Reformed Theology we sometimes categorize these generally as God's "potential ordinata" (ordinary power) his "potentia absoluta." (special intervention power). The former was not withdrawn, if so, then God would have annhilated them as soon as they sinned. Rather, this was planned from the beginning, or do you prefer the God of Open Theism who makes it up as he goes along?
God is all knowing and his withdrawal of grace from Adam is a violation his His holy character How does God's absolute knowledge of everything effect the withdrawal of grace from Adam?
God is sovereign but He is also holy and the idea a withdrawal of grace from His good, sinless creature is what makes reformed theology repulsive. God loved Adam so much that He gave Adam Eve. There is no mention of God removing His grace from Adam.
This is only true if Adam has a just claim on the grace of God, but, by definition, even in a state of innocence, man has no just claim on the grace of God. However, in that event grace ceases to be gracious. Your claim would prove too much, because if true, it would be equally true for the libertarian and would mean that God is not "holy" if He allows secondary causes to work themselves out in the world and does not contrain evil in the hearts of men until the eschaton.
God does not withdraw common grace prefall or post, rather we speak of the withholding of special grace, in this case the restraint man's will in regard to what will certainly occur in the narraive, but even common grace in the postlapsarian age is a result of the Noahic Covenant. However, I thank you for your tacit admission that you think that the whole of life is just an exercise in remunerative justice. God is free to give grace as He sees fit, particularly when He has a plan and is going to use this event to bring about a higher order good. And Scripture says very directly that is is God who has shut up all into disobedience, in order to show mercy to Jews and Gentiles.
You and others have failed to provide any biblical support for this ridiculous notion. Nice try, Gene.
On the contrary, this is is precisely the way that libertarian action theory itself frames the question, for, in Arminianism, God does not give effacious grace to keep Adam from falling, and there is a vast literature on the Covenant of Works and the Fall in Reformed Theology too, and if providing "biblical" evidence is a defeater for me, it is equally a defeater for you, because Scripture doesn't give us a blow-by-blow of what went through Adam's mind. You're like the atheist who asks for a speculative answer then cries about it when we give it to him. I merely framed my responses to your objection, and I answered in a manner in which even libertarians concur.
Your original objection was framed to answer my referal to Arminian order of decrees at point of minimal variance with the infras and supras. The only difference is that for the one, the permission is effacious, for the other it is "bare." You have yet to overturn this.
I also provided a treatment drawn from the classic formulation of the Covenant of Works and from the Arminian order of decrees. This apparently went right over your head. You say that you know what Calvinism teaches, but apparently you were unable to recognize this. God's resting indicates that He chose not to actively intervene in the affairs of creation on that day. Instead, he allowed the fall to play out according to plan.
Adam acting according to his inclination at the moment. He was able to do good or evil, to act according to his strongest desire, and was apparently inclined to neither good nor evil, but capable of desires that would serve to determine his postlapsarian state. He wanted to eat the fruit to satisfy a desire, desire that seemed good to him at the time, but resulted in disobedience, which was in turn a result of his reasoning processes. The mind chose. This is a defeater for your iibertarian action theory, because on that model that decision had no cause. Any appeal to any cause for you is an appeal to compatibilism. Nice try, Rob.
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Really? According to Scripture the Holy Spirit led Jesus into the wilderness. There he was tempted by Satan. He sent Jesus into the right time and right place. According to the Bible God incited David to make a census, or was that Satan? Oh, that's right, God used Satan as his agent. This is called secondary causality.
Calvinists have doctrine of secondary causation, perhaps you should look into it.
Second, Boettner and Dabney's illustrations fail to answer the all important question of where Adam got his desire to sin. Withholding grace, while it may appear to solve this dilemna, fails to provide where Adam got this foreign idea to sin. It was foreign because God declared Adam good and his nature was without sin. This elementary distinction you have simply overlooked.
This is an assertion without a supporting argument on your part actually interacting with Dabney, but I'll let that pass for now.
I cited them, because you stated that two separate propositions.
First you stated:
This removal of grace on Adam goes beyond what traditional Calvinism teaches.
But "traditional Calvinism" does teach that very thing. So your original statement was flatly disproven.
Then you went on to assert elsewhere that it was our view that Adam was good by nature . You stated: It was foreign because God declared Adam good and his nature was without sin. This elementary distinction you have simply overlooked.
I assume you mean this ontologically good. I have overlooked nothing. Being without sin and in a state of positive moral goodness that is incapable of evil "by nature" are not convertible propositions. You're the one that has overlooked this.
Ontologically, Adam was "without sin" but in a state of innocence, not in a glorified state of positive moral goodness. Classical theologians call this the Libertas Adami.
Likewise, our view is that he was created in a state of innocence, not ontological goodness. He was able to sin and not to sin. He was not created in a state of goodness. He was created in a state of innocency, not knowing good and not knowing evil. In other words, in his created state man was able to good and evil, but by nature inclined to neither good nor evil. Your entire assumption that you have not proven is that Adam was by nature inclined to good. That would be so in the Redeemed state, where we can do good or evil but are inclined to do good or the glorified state, where we can do good but not evil and are inclined to good but not evil and are immutably locked into that state. That inclination simply does not always prevail in the Redeemed state, because we are still dealing with the principle of sin and are not constrained from sin by nature as we are in the glorified state.
I'm about to have major cancer surgery and do not know if you will even see this, but I will be unable to reply to you for many months, if at all. I suggest you purchase Thomas Boston's book, Human Nature in Its 4fold State.
You seem to be hung up on the meaning of "nature" in these discussions.
There are at least two uses of the term "nature" that need to be distinguished if one's exposition is to have any hope of avoiding the most absurd equivocations or incoherance.
The first is what we might call the *kind-property* view of natures. This account of natures answers the question: What *kind* of entity is the given individual? This account treats natures as *natural kind* properties, where properties are *abstract* objects of a certain sort. Among the important characteristics of such objects: (a) they have the property of possibly having instances, or possibly having individuals stand in the *exemplification relation* to them, and (b) the posited objects are causally inert. That is, the objects do not *cause* any object to be such-and-such, or thus-and-so.
The second is what could be called the "constituency" view of human natures, where human natures are (complex) dispositions (or in Evan's preferred terminology "predispositions"), inclinations, or similar entities; where each of these entities is a constituent, or a (mereological) *part* of some concrete individual, like a moral agent or a personal substance. This account of natures makes no attempt to tell us what *kind* of entity a given individual is, but rather, it attempts to tell us what constitutes a moral agent, and what relation his relevant constituent "parts" bear to his actions or behavior. The thing to note here is that the posited entities are *causal* entities of some sort (which alone should clue one in to the fact that this account of "nature" differs significantly from the kind-property view mentioned above).
Here are some important consequences to note about these two uses and their differences:
(1) when the kind-property account of natures is in view, it makes no *literal* sense to ask whether human nature or humanity *itself* is morally good or evil. Humanity and human nature are neither good nor evil. The reason why is obvious: only moral agents can be good or evil, and natural kind properties (or any properties at all for that matter) are not moral agents. They are causally inert, abstract objects. On this understanding of natures, it makes no more sense to say of humanity that it is morally good or evil than it makes sense to say of the number 8 that its morally good or evil.
(2) when the kind-property account of natures is in view, the claim that any morally significant action A performed by some individual was *determined* by the human nature of that individual is *false*, since no morally significant behavior or properties are *kind-essential* properties of humanity or human nature. At best, such moral qualities are *contingent* properties of humanity. This is evidenced by the moral goodness of prelapsarian humans like Adam and Eve (and Christ), as well as the postlapsarian sinfulness of humans like you and I.
So, in the fourfold state of human nature, we teach:
Created State: Telelogically/Morally Able to do : Good (yes) Evil (yes) - Ontologically (By nature inclined to) Good (no) Evil (no)
Following (for space) the same categorical pattern:
Fallen: Good (no) Evil (yes) - Good (no) Evil (yes)
Redeemed: Good (yes) Evil (yes) - Good (yes) Evil (no)
Glorified: Good (yes) Evil (no) - Good (yes) Evil (no)
God pronounces creation "good" at the end of Genesis 1. This is an example of the first defintion of "nature." But, there is also no pronouncement that Adam is morally perfect or incapable of doing evil. Rather, he knows God's commands, and is created innocent and does not know evil. Adam and Eve had the moral power to obey all these expectations of their Sovereign Master, and did not have a fallen mind that would obscure what was right and true. However, they were not glorified humans in an ontologically immutable, holy state. Rather, they were "holy" because that's all they knew. They were "happy," because that's all they knew.
They were also created with a mind and the power to reason, and it is here that Satan tempts them. They formed a new set of values, and it is from here that their motive to sin sprung.
"Determinism" with relation to will refers not only to the internal desires but the external as well. The question of "why did Adam and Eve sin" does not arise from questions about their internal moral state in Reformed Theology (as you seem to think) but of the determination of their outward conditions, for these, in turn, can *also* determine our behavior. The question arises as to how the two good result in the fall, if the creation is kind-property good and man is "holy, just, and good" but yet mutable.
Sin is itself framed here through temptation, but temptation to what? To be like God and to eat, neither of which are, in themselves, sinful desires. The desire to "be like God" is not a sinful desire in itself. It is natural for man to do that. That is precisely what sanctification in the life of the believer is. It is "being like God" on God's terms. So, what we have here is Adam acting with "good intentions" and yet deceived but, in so doing, violating God's law because, for a motive sufficient for action, he has formed a new value system. That is frequently the way temptation is framed in Scripture. The desire to do x is not, in itself, ontologically "evil," but teleologically it is, because it moves you to violate a command of God in order to satisfy that desire. So, even if Adam can be said to be ontologically "good" we have him acting on a "good" desire by "evil" methods. So, even on your own view, there is no conflict here. The point here is this: all we need to prove is that there was a motive. Why? Because libertarian action theory denies that motives are causes of moral action.
This is, in point of fact, the way the temptation of Jesus is framed. Jesus was worthy of worship; all the kingdoms of the world belong to him already; hunger is not in itself a sinful desire; rather the temptation for him is to set aside His mission. Some have further argued, in my opinion not very persuasively, that if Jesus had chosen not to enact His mission, He would not have sinned, because He did not have to enact His mission at all anyway; it was His to enact as an act of grace and mercy. For Adam, this was not the case, because he was certainly under a divine command to act as a priest in the proto-templar Garden. The real test was for him to cast out the serpent. He ate the fruit, where he should have cast out the serpent.
Just because God is silent during the time Adam committed sin does not necessarily mean God withdrew his grace from Adam at this moment.
You seem to think grace is always unmerited favor. There is another definition, "empowerment to act" and still another "common grace." Likewise, we distinguish between special grace (like inspiration of Scripture) and common grace too. According to both the Calvinist order of decrees and the Arminian, "permission" is the withdrawal of the empowerment not unmerited favor and of special grace, but not common grace. In Reformed Theology we sometimes categorize these generally as God's "potential ordinata" (ordinary power) his "potentia absoluta." (special intervention power). The former was not withdrawn, if so, then God would have annhilated them as soon as they sinned. Rather, this was planned from the beginning, or do you prefer the God of Open Theism who makes it up as he goes along?
God is all knowing and his withdrawal of grace from Adam is a violation his His holy character How does God's absolute knowledge of everything effect the withdrawal of grace from Adam?
God is sovereign but He is also holy and the idea a withdrawal of grace from His good, sinless creature is what makes reformed theology repulsive. God loved Adam so much that He gave Adam Eve. There is no mention of God removing His grace from Adam.
This is only true if Adam has a just claim on the grace of God, but, by definition, even in a state of innocence, man has no just claim on the grace of God. However, in that event grace ceases to be gracious. Your claim would prove too much, because if true, it would be equally true for the libertarian and would mean that God is not "holy" if He allows secondary causes to work themselves out in the world and does not contrain evil in the hearts of men until the eschaton.
God does not withdraw common grace prefall or post, rather we speak of the withholding of special grace, in this case the restraint man's will in regard to what will certainly occur in the narraive, but even common grace in the postlapsarian age is a result of the Noahic Covenant. However, I thank you for your tacit admission that you think that the whole of life is just an exercise in remunerative justice. God is free to give grace as He sees fit, particularly when He has a plan and is going to use this event to bring about a higher order good. And Scripture says very directly that is is God who has shut up all into disobedience, in order to show mercy to Jews and Gentiles.
You and others have failed to provide any biblical support for this ridiculous notion. Nice try, Gene.
On the contrary, this is is precisely the way that libertarian action theory itself frames the question, for, in Arminianism, God does not give effacious grace to keep Adam from falling, and there is a vast literature on the Covenant of Works and the Fall in Reformed Theology too, and if providing "biblical" evidence is a defeater for me, it is equally a defeater for you, because Scripture doesn't give us a blow-by-blow of what went through Adam's mind. You're like the atheist who asks for a speculative answer then cries about it when we give it to him. I merely framed my responses to your objection, and I answered in a manner in which even libertarians concur.
Your original objection was framed to answer my referal to Arminian order of decrees at point of minimal variance with the infras and supras. The only difference is that for the one, the permission is effacious, for the other it is "bare." You have yet to overturn this.
I also provided a treatment drawn from the classic formulation of the Covenant of Works and from the Arminian order of decrees. This apparently went right over your head. You say that you know what Calvinism teaches, but apparently you were unable to recognize this. God's resting indicates that He chose not to actively intervene in the affairs of creation on that day. Instead, he allowed the fall to play out according to plan.
Adam acting according to his inclination at the moment. He was able to do good or evil, to act according to his strongest desire, and was apparently inclined to neither good nor evil, but capable of desires that would serve to determine his postlapsarian state. He wanted to eat the fruit to satisfy a desire, desire that seemed good to him at the time, but resulted in disobedience, which was in turn a result of his reasoning processes. The mind chose. This is a defeater for your iibertarian action theory, because on that model that decision had no cause. Any appeal to any cause for you is an appeal to compatibilism. Nice try, Rob.
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